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Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of free trade on welfare in a two-country world modelled as
an international Hotelling duopoly with quadratic transport costs and asymmetric countries, where
a negative environmental externality is associated with the consumption of the good produced in the
smaller country. Countries’ relative sizes as well as the intensity of negative environmental externality
a↵ect potential welfare gains of trade liberalisation. In line with Lambertini (1997a) we show that,
as long as no trade policy is undertaken by the government of the larger country, trade liberalisation
is not feasible since the latter always loses from opening to trade. A subsidy policy in favour of the
firm producing the clean good is, on the contrary, shown to give both countries the right incentives to
liberalize trade. Allowing for redistributive transfers between countries further extends the parametric
range for which trade liberalisation is feasible under the subsidy scheme. The alternative situation,
in which the green firm is based in the larger country, is also briefly sketched to find that free trade
does give rise to a global welfare increment with no need of accompanying trade policies.
JEL Numbers: F12, L13, H23
Keywords: International trade, geographical nation size, spatial competition, environmental
externality
1 Introduction
In the last two decades, economists have massively contributed to the discussion on the environmental
e↵ects of trade liberalisation and the e↵ects of countries’ environmental conditions on their competitivity.
This task has been carried out taking into consideration di↵erent industrial configurations, either Bertrand
or Cournot competition as well as di↵erent definitions of the environmental damage.
What we propose here is an additional contribution that formally tackles the problem relying on
a spatial framework a` la Hotelling, were two firms produce an horizontally di↵erentiated good. The
comparatively small theoretical literature existing in this area (see Lambertini (1997a); and Tharakan
and Thisse (2002)) has indeed pointed out the presence of interesting asymmetric e↵ects on welfare,
arising in that specific, partial equilibrium framework. In the spatial framework, in fact - if transport
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costs are quadratic in distance - the smaller country has been shown to undoubtedly benefit from free
trade by increasing its own firm’s sales: its firm’s profits increase at the expenses of the consumer surplus
of the larger country. This also implies that trade liberalisation, although improving welfare at the
world level, necessarily has a negative impact on the welfare of the larger among the two countries:
if firms can preserve market power via endogenous di↵erentiation, the geographical size matters and
trade liberalisation asymmetric e↵ects on welfare are mainly driven by profits dynamics. Our intention
is to verify whether taking environmental issues into account may modify this conclusion in favour of
a positive symmetric e↵ect of trade liberalisation which, obviously, is a necessary condition for free
trade to emerge spontaneously at equilibrium. In our model, asymmetry in size and horizontal product
di↵erentiation combine with a few additional features: (i) consumers in larger of the two countries are
environmentally concerned, while their fellow consumers abroad are not; as a result, (ii) the firm based in
the environmentally aware market is green from the outset, while her equivalent based abroad is brown;
and (iii) pollution is taken to be a consequence of consumption, so that it is not transboundary under
autarky, while any penetration of the environmentally aware country on the part of the brown firm causes
environmentally concerned consumers to experience some degree of environmental externality, increasing
in the volume of imports. To this regard, a few aspects require some clarification. First, since in the
real world larger countries are generally net exporters of polluting products, in our model, country size
is to be intended as the number of consumers with a su ciently high disposable income which are then
supposed to share a similar consumption pattern with analogous consumers worldwide. This allows us
to say that large emerging countries (China, India and Brazil) are, de facto, small relative to developed
countries such that those of Western Europe. Second, the fact that in our model the smaller (poorer)
country’s firm is the one producing a brown good may be justified by resorting to the so-called pollution
haven hypothesis: poorer countries have a comparative advantage in the production of brown goods,
given their laxer pollution policies.1
Finally, even if the model encompasses exclusively the special case of contiguous countries, it is
perfectly able to account for trade liberalisation e↵ects in the case of geographically distant countries,
provided that the negative externality is generated by consumption rather than by production. Our
model is therefore suitable for approaching some policy issues: may consumers’ environmental awareness,
per se, change the distribution of gain and losses stemming from trade liberalisation by limiting the
demand of the brown good? Must a tari↵/subsidy policy intervene to correct or eliminate altogether this
externality? We find that the large country can gain from trade liberalisation only if a reversal of the
pattern of trade is feasible, that is, if the smaller country is not so small. In that case, in fact, the former
can always adopt a subsidy policy to induce the trade reversal and this, in addition to setting the home
emission level to zero, reduces its level abroad.
Our work draws on three strands of the theoretical literature: the first on spatial competition a` la
Hotelling, the second on the environmental e↵ects of international trade (in the presence of a trade policy)
and the third on the environmental e↵ects of consumers’ environmental awareness. Suitable background
for the first one is available in standard references such as D’Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse (1979),
Lambertini (1997b) and Tabuchi and Thisse (1995) as well as in Lambertini (1997a) and Tharakan and
Thisse (2002). The latter two works specifically focus on the e↵ects of international trade in a Hotelling
international duopoly and, since they both encompass asymmetry in the size of countries, also represent
1To this regard, see Copeland and Taylor (2004) for a review.
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the most appropriate comparative background for our model.2
The second strand of literature is particularly rich and contributions have proceeded in several direc-
tions. We may refer the reader to works which merely or primarily attempt to assess the links between
trading regimes and environmental outcomes, these being defined in terms of level/incidence of pollution3
or in terms of natural resources/environmental capital depletion.4 Secondly, a larger part of this litera-
ture has essentially faced policy issues, both in terms of environmental policies (price controls, emission
tradable permits and pollution quotas) and trade policies. To this regard, comprehensive assessments
are provided by Copeland and Taylor (2004) and Copeland (2011) referring both to what concerns the
e↵ects of trade liberalisation on environmental policy and the e↵ects of environmental problems on trade
policy.5 To this regard, issues of particular interest are the use of trade policies to achieve environmental
objectives and vice-versa, the adoption of environmental policy in order to distort trade flows. More-
over, a few contributions has focused on the relation between trade, transboundary pollution and climate
change.6
Concerning the third strand of literature, despite the fact that our model includes a very simple
modelisation of environmental awareness, it is reminiscent of previous important contributions such as
Conrad (2005), tackling the problem of the e↵ect of environmental awareness on equilibrium prices,
product characteristics and market shares of two Hotelling-style firms. Again in a spatial framework,
remarkable works are those of Rodr´ıguez-Ibeas (2007) and Clemenz (2010), while Yakita and Yamauchi
(2011) adopt a Cournot oligopoly framework with horizontal product di↵erentiation. Papers by Eriksson
(2004), Moraga-Gonza´lez and Padro´n-Fumero (2002) and Bansal and Gangopadhyay (2003) are largely
focus on the relation between the presence of environmentally concerned consumers and the e cacy of
2The same question is posed in a similar framework by Shachmurove and Spiegel (1995), while Egger and Egger (2007,
2010) analyze the consequences of free trade in a spatial model allowing for a change in the industrial structure and in
firms’ organization.
3See Copeland and Taylor (2003, 2004) for an exhaustive review of the literature. As an example, the framework
proposed by Copeland and Taylor (1994), is that of a static two-country model where each country produces a continuum
of goods di↵erentiated by the degree of greenness (here authors allow the government to set pollution taxes); they find
that income is positively correlated with the degree of environmental protection, while, in the presence of a su ciently
unequal distribution of income at the world level, free trade raises pollution. In a similar manner Antweiler, Copeland,
and Taylor (2001) introduce a pollution tax which is shown to influence the pattern of trade, coherently with the pollution
haven hypothesis: the higher the country’s income, the stricter the pollution policy, the higher the comparative advantage
in clean good. Finally, Fujiwara (2009) investigates the e↵ects of free trade on global stock of pollution using a two-country
di↵erential game model. Additional contributions are the works from Zeng and Zhao (2009), Ederington, Levinson, and
Minier (2004) and, in a purely empirical context, Frankel and Rose (2005).
4Here, primary references are the papers from Brander and Taylor (1997) and Copeland and Taylor (1999); the former
concludes that trade may be welfare reducing for a small country net exporter of diversified resources since it enhances
natural resources depletion, while the latter provides an explanation for trade based on spatial separation of incompatible
industries due to production-production negative externalities in terms of reduction of environmental capital. Chichilnisky
(1994) proposes an explanation of international (North-South) trade based on the di↵erence in the definition of property
rights on environmental resources, in her framework, taxing the use of resources in the South leads to increasing extraction.
More Recent works are those of Taylor (2011) and Copeland and Taylor (2009). The former develops a model in which open
access together with natural resource’s fixed price and innovation can explain how international trade can bring about a
rapid decline in the environmental capital of a country while the latter link the country’s choice of the resource exploitation
regime to the dynamics of world prices.
5With respect to the this issue other remarkable references are the works by Neary (2006), Haupt (2006), McAusland
(2008) and Bagwell and Staiger (2001).
6To this regard see Copeland and Taylor (2005), Fischer and Fox (2009), Gros (2009), Keen and Kotsogiannis (2011)
and Holland (2009).
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environmental policies, while Espinola-Arredondo and Zhao (2011) try to assess the welfare implications
of subsidisation/taxation policies in a linear city model very similar to ours, even if abstracting from the
e↵ects of trade.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, the autarkic
equilibrium and the the e↵ects of trade liberalisation. Section 3 shows how di↵erent trade policies can
a↵ect long run social welfare of both countries. Section 4 considers the opposite case in which the larger
country is the one where the brown good is produced. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We rely on the general framework of D’Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse (1979) as modified by Lam-
bertini (1997a) by introducing asymmetry in countries’ size. Two firms operate in a linear world of unit
length where firm 1 is necessarily located in country 1 and firm 2 in country 2. Consumers are uniformly
distributed over [0, 1] with density 1 and that a share ↵ of them belongs to country 1 while the comple-
ment to 1 belongs to country 2. Since ↵ is to be intended as the border, asymmetry in countries’ sizes
is assured by limiting it in the interval (0, 1/2) so as country 1 is smaller than country 2. A constant
marginal cost of production is common to both firms7 and no relocation costs are modeled. We extend
the model by supposing existence of an additional asymmetry w.r.t. the environmental impact of con-
sumption, in such a way that consuming the product supplied by firm 1 entails a negative externality,
while the good supplied by firm 2 is green. We may justify this assumption by supposing that consumers
in country 2 have developed an environmental awareness at some point in the past, while this does not
apply to consumers living in country 1. This has two consequences. The first is the presence of a linear
damage function such that country i’s social welfare is reduced by an amount Di which is equal to:
Di =  y1i with i = 1, 2,
where y1i is country i’s total consumption of the brown good produced by firm 1 while   represents
the emission intensity. The second consequence is the representation of consumer preferences in the two
countries. In both, each consumer has a unit demand and consumption yields a constant positive surplus
s; net utility, however, will or will not account for pollution, depending on the location of a specific
consumer. Consider first an individual based in country 1. For him/her, net utility is defined as:
U1 = s  td2i   pi, i = 1, 2, (2.1)
where pi is the price of variety i and td2i is the transportation cost, quadratic in distance di from firm i;
the latter is defined as:
di = m  xi, (2.2)
where m and xi are, respectively, the generic consumer’s and firm’s i locations.
Looking instead at a consumer based in country 2, the corresponding net surplus is defined as:
U2 = s  td2i   pi  D2, i = 1, 2, (2.3)
where D2 = 0 in autarky. For the sake of simplicity, and without further loss of generality, we also
normalize the transportation cost rate t to one.
7Here assumed to be nil without loss of generality.
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2.1 Autarkic equilibrium
In autarky, the monopoly price set by each firm nullifies the net surplus Ui of the marginal consumers,
i.e., those living at country borders 0, ↵ or 1:
pA1 = s  (↵  xA1 )2; pA2 = s  (1  xA2 )2, (2.4)
where xA1 = ↵/2 and x
A
2 = (↵+1)/2 are the socially optimal locations in autarky (denoted by superscript
A), minimizing total transportation costs in each country:
TCA1 =
ˆ ↵
0
(d1)
2dm; TCA2 =
ˆ 1
↵
(d2)
2dm. (2.5)
These of course also appears in the definition of consumer surpluses:
CSA1 =
ˆ ↵
0
[s  p1   (d1)2]dm; CSA2 =
ˆ 1
↵
[s  p2   (d2)2]dm. (2.6)
As for social welfare in country 1 and 2, respectively defined as:
SWA1 = ⇡
A
1 + CS
A
1    ↵; SWA2 = ⇡A2 + CSA2 ;
the autarky equilibrium yields:
SWA1 = ↵
✓
s  1
12
↵2    
◆
; SWA2 = (1  ↵)[s 
1
12
(1  ↵)2]. (2.7)
Note that while social welfare of country 1 is negatively a↵ected by consumption of the brown good (yA11 =
↵), this does not a↵ect social welfare of country 2 (since the externality is generated by consumption, no
transboundary pollution is supposed to exist). Moreover, non negativity of both prices requires imposing
a condition on the level of gross consumer surplus common to all consumers, which is (see Appendix A.1):
s   sAp =
1
4
 
1  2↵+ ↵2  . (2.8)
The autarkic equilibrium definitions of other relevant magnitudes are reported in Appendix A.
2.2 The free trade equilibrium
In this section we evaluate the consequences of trade liberalisation by allowing firms to relocate and adjust
prices in order to maximize profits. The only restriction we pose is that firms cannot relocate outside the
unit segment measuring the size of this two-country economy.8 The first step consists in understanding
whether the environmental externality can a↵ect the equilibrium partition of demand under free trade,
or not.
Lemma 1 [Demand partition and environmental awareness] The position of the indi↵erent consumer is
independent of emission intensity (or environmental awareness).
8In this respect, the present approach di↵ers from what is typically accepted in other papers using the same model
(Tabuchi and Thisse (1995); Lambertini (1997b)). The reason is that here the single spatial dimension necessarily accounts
for both possible interpretations, as a geographical space and as the preference space.
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Proof. The indi↵erent consumer’s location mˆ (i.e., the identity of the consumer which determining
market shares) is identified by the following condition:
pT1 + (mˆ  xT1 )2 +  (mˆ  ↵) = pT2 + (mˆ  xT2 )2 +  (mˆ  ↵), (2.9)
where superscript T stands for free trade and the term  (mˆ   ↵) represents the value of the damage
function D2 when mˆ ↵ consumers of country 2 buy from firm 1. This condition is then defined only for
mˆ > ↵ which implies the marginal consumer has to be located in country 2.
Solving (2.9) for mˆ then yields:
mˆ =
pT1   pT2 + (xT1 )2   (xT2 )2
2(xT1   xT2 )
. (2.10)
Market demands are therefore defined as:
yT1 = mˆ =
8>>><>>>:
mˆ iff mˆ 2 (0, 1);
1 iff mˆ   1;
0 iff mˆ  0.
; yT2 = 1  mˆ =
8>>><>>>:
1  mˆ iff 1  mˆ 2 (0, 1);
1 iff 1  mˆ   1;
0 iff 1  mˆ  0.
. (2.11)
That is, since consumers in country 2 incorporate the environmental externality irrespectively of their
consumption choice (whether green or brown), the volume of firm 1’s exports to country 2 is altogether
una↵ected by the environmental awareness of the recipients. As a consequence, the two-stage subgame
perfect equilibrium in pure strategies arising under free trade coincides with Lambertini (1997a), with
maximum di↵erentiation at xT1 = 0, x
T
2 = 1 and equilibrium prices and profits p
L
1 = p
L
2 = t = 1; and
⇡L1 = ⇡
L
2 =
t
2 =
1
2 . And, of course, mˆ =
1
2 .
No additional condition on s, ↵,   is thus required to assure the non-negativity of prices and profits while
a new condition on gross surplus must hold in order for full market coverage to be sustainable, i.e.,
s   sTMC =
1
4
[5 + 2 (1  2↵)], (2.12)
where
sTMC > s
A
p 8↵ 2]0, 1/2[,  2]0, 1[,
so as condition for market coverage in the long run also assures non-negativity of prices in autarky.
Concerning price dynamics in the shift from autarky to free trade, we have that pL1 < p
A
1 and p
L
2 < p
A
2
8↵ 2 (0, 1/2),  2 (0, 1). Remaining magnitudes are reported in Appendix A.
2.3 Trade liberalisation e↵ects
The results described in the previous subsections allow us to analyze the e↵ects of trade liberalisation in
terms of changes in the relevant magnitudes. These are summarised in the following
Proposition 1 [Welfare] Trade liberalisation causes (i) an increase in the welfare of the smaller country
if the latter is su ciently small; (ii) a decrease in the welfare of the larger country; (iii) a decrease in
the welfare at the world level.
Proof. See Appendix A.
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Hence, since free trade is unambiguously detrimental for the larger country (regardless of the degree of
asymmetry in size and the emission intensity), trade opening is a strictly dominated strategy for the
latter. From this it follows that trade liberalisation is unlikely to occur, which is true even if allowing for
side payments, since the gain in social welfare for the smaller country is never high enough to compensate
for the loss borne by the larger one.
In order to understand why trade liberalisation has always a negative impact on the larger country’s
welfare as well as on the smaller country’s welfare in most of the cases, we now proceed to decompose the
e↵ects on social welfare into two separate elements, namely, the consequences of trade on firms’ profits
as well as on consumer surpluses. As to the latter magnitude, the following holds:
Proposition 2 [Consumer Surplus] Trade liberalisation, by decreasing both prices, determines an in-
crease in consumer surplus in both countries.
Proof. See Appendix A.
With free trade, instantaneous firms’ relocation in correspondence of the world economy’s borders entails
an increase in transportation costs for both countries. Thus, the positive e↵ect on worldwide consumer
surplus has to be necessarily determined by the decrease in prices, due to the Bertrand competition
arising in the international duopoly setting.
We now move to consider how trade liberalisation a↵ects profits in the long run.
Proposition 3 [Profits] Free trade brings about an increase in the profit accruing to the firm based in
the smaller country provided that the latter is su ciently small, while it always hurts the firm based in
the larger country.
Proof. As far as firm 2 is concerned, the statement contained in in Proposition 3 is intuitive: since trade
liberalisation entails diminishing demand, the negative quantity e↵ect sums up to the negative price e↵ect
and profits shrink, regardless of ↵ and  . As to Firm 1 we have that:
⇡T1   ⇡A1 =
1
4
⇥
2  ↵  4s  ↵2 ⇤ > 0,
iff s < sT1 =
2 + ↵3
4↵
, (2.13)
where sT1 is strictly decreasing in ↵, with s
T
1 2]1, 1716 [ as ↵ 2]0, 12 [. Moreover s < sT1 is necessary but not
su cient condition for (2.13) to hold in equilibrium since also sT1 > s
T
MC , which assures non-negativity
of prices and full market coverage, has to be met. The latter is verified for ↵ 2]0, 1 +p2 w 0.414[ and
  2]0,min[ 2 5↵+↵32↵ 4↵2 , 1][.9
Thus, as far as firm 1 is concerned, the gain in profits associated to trade liberalisation is decreasing in
↵. An higher ↵, in fact, strengthens price competition and, moreover, reduces the positive quantity e↵ect
of trade liberalisation ( 12  ↵): since equilibrium location of the marginal consumer is not a↵ected by the
relative size of country 1, the gain in demand accruing to firm 1 is decreasing in ↵.
Moreover, from (2.13), the gain in profits is decreasing in the individual consumer surplus s too. This is
due to the fact that a higher s, via an increase in the price of the brown variety, raises profits autarkic
equilibrium level, though leaving una↵ected the corresponding level in free trade.10 This also formally
9This also implies that (2.13) holds, regardless of the level of  , for ↵ 2]0, 12 (
p
33  5) w 0.372[.
10Since, when duopolistic competition arises, exactly the same e↵ect is shown to be entirely transferred to consumer
surpluses (see Appendix (A.1) and (A.2) ).
7
explains the existence of a substitution e↵ect between the asymmetry in size and the individual consumer
surplus, that is, why threshold sT1 is decreasing in ↵: when countries are very similar in size, the autarkic
profits must be very low to preserve the existence of a gain associated to trade liberalisation, since the
latter entails a lower quantity e↵ect .
Lastly, if country 1 is su ciently large (↵ > 0.372), we have identified an upper threshold for the emission
intensity (  = 2 5↵+↵
3
2↵ 4↵2 ). If   >
2 5↵+↵3
2↵ 4↵2 , it follows that s
T
1 < s
T
MC that is for all levels of s which
assure non-negativity of prices and full market coverage firm 1 cannot gain from free trade.
Hence, trade liberalisation has asymmetric e↵ects on firms’ profits: while it unambiguously implies a loss
for firm 2 it may favour firm 1. Since free trade brings about a decrease in both equilibrium prices, this is
necessarily due to the di↵erence in the sign of the quantity e↵ect which is clearly negative for the larger
country and positive for the smaller. Propositions 1-3 have been summarised in Table 1.
Country
1 2
TC " "
CS " "
p # #
y " #
⇡ l #
SW l #
Table 1: Trade liberalisation, signs of magnitudes’ variations.
To conclude, the shift from autarkic to free trade equilibrium has not univocal implications from the
point of view of social welfare of country 1: until country 1 is small enough (↵ < 0.4735), in fact, the
gain in consumer surplus for its inhabitants outweighs any loss in firm’s profits, regardless of the level
of   and s; for higher ↵ the opposite is true: the dynamic of profits is unambiguously negative and the
gain in consumer surplus is reduced. The intuition behind the latter e↵ect is straightforward: the price
that firm 1 can sustain in autarky is decreasing in ↵ due to the fact that she must compensate for higher
transportation costs borne by consumers, while is constant in free trade; this sums up with the fact that
↵ has a stronger positive e↵ect on the free trade equilibrium level of transportation costs as compared to
those of autarky.
For what concerns country 2, we conclude that, though welfare reducing, trade liberalisation acts in
favour of a redistribution of welfare from the firm to the consumers: the price e↵ect stemming from
duopolisitic competition raises the consumer surplus, and, together with an output reduction, implies a
decrease in the profits accruing to the domestic firm.
3 Trade policy
We now proceed to analyze the long-run consequences of trade liberalisation when the government of
country 2, which is otherwise unambiguously su↵ering from the opening of trade, implements a trade
policy. To this end we define two policies: a linear tari↵ weighted by the emission intensity - which is
indeed formally equivalent to a Pigouvian tax on imports - and a subsidy for firm 2, where the latter is
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supposed to be financed by an equivalent decrease in country 2’s social welfare.
3.1 Import Tari↵
We first suppose that country 2’s government levies a tari↵ ⌧ > 0 on the negative externality generated
by the volume of the imported brown variety, so that the profits of firm 1 are lowered by an amount equal
to:11
⌧ (mˆT⌧   ↵).
We can then write:
⇡T⌧1 = p
T⌧
1 mˆT⌧   ⌧ (mˆT⌧   ↵), (3.1)
and
SWT⌧2 = ⇡
T⌧
2 + CS
T⌧
2    (mˆT⌧   ↵) + ⌧ (mˆT⌧   ↵), (3.2)
where T ⌧ stands for trade with tari↵. In equilibrium, social welfare of country 2 is thus supposed to
be augmented by an amount equal to the gross tari↵ income; the definition of all other magnitudes is
unchanged w.r.t. the case described in section 3. Again, the equilibrium arising is such that xT⌧1 = 0 and
xT⌧2 = 1, implying the following marginal consumer’s equilibrium location:
mˆT⌧ =
1
6
(3   ⌧); (3.3)
while equilibrium prices are pT⌧1 = 1+
2 ⌧
3 ; p
T⌧
2 = 1+
 ⌧
3 . From the condition of non negativity of country
2’s imports (mˆT⌧   ↵ > 0) we can derive the maximum admissible level of the tari↵ ⌧ :
⌧¯ =
3  6↵
 
. (3.4)
For each ⌧ > ⌧¯ , the model thus predicts a reversal of trade flows with mˆT⌧ < ↵; this would formally
translate the tari↵ into a subsidy for firm 1, which, clearly, is not among the feasible policies available to
country 2’s government, and would invalidate the definition of the demand system. Full market coverage
is now assured if consumers’ gross surplus is greater than:
sT⌧MC =
1
36
 
45 + 18    36↵  + 18 ⌧   6 2⌧ +  2⌧2  , (3.5)
where, again, sT⌧MC > s
A
p 8↵ 2]0, 1/2[,   2]0, 1[, ⌧ > 0; while the non negativity of both prices is always
verified.
The objective function of the government of country 2 is then:
max
⌧
SWT⌧2 s.t. ⌧ < ⌧¯ , (3.6)
which yields:
⌧⇤ =
2  2↵+  
 
8 ↵ 2]0, 1
4
[,   2]0, 1  4↵[.
Note that optimal tari↵ ⌧⇤ is decreasing in both   and ↵. For ⌧ = ⌧⇤ the marginal consumer locates at:
mˆ⇤T⌧ =
1 + 2↵   
6
. (3.7)
11Note that this formulation implies that the optimal tari↵ may e↵ectively result in a trade policy instrument and not
only in an environmental policy one since, in principle, its level may be either more or less than compensate the value of
the damage function D2.
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Thus, for   2]1 4↵, 1[, country 2’s government cannot implement ⌧⇤ since ⌧⇤ > ⌧¯ , it will then necessarily
choose a sub-optimal tari↵ ⌧ = ⌧¯ in order to maximize social welfare.12 Indeed, for all 0 < ⌧ < ⌧⇤:
@SWT⌧2
@⌧
=
1
12
⇥
2 (2  2↵+  )  2 2⌧⇤ > 0 8 ↵ 2]0, 1
4
[,   2]1  4↵, 1[.
The reason for optimal tari↵ never restoring autarky for   < 1   4↵, is that, in correspondence of
⌧ = ⌧⇤ < ⌧¯ , a higher tari↵ would imply, via higher prices, a reduction in consumers’ surplus of country
2 strictly greater than the gain in firm 2 profits and in gross tari↵ revenues. For very low ↵ and   a full
import substitution obtained through a tari↵ is thus not feasible, implying a too high cost to be borne by
consumers. Equilibrium definitions of magnitudes relatives to both ⌧ = ⌧⇤ and ⌧ = ⌧¯ cases are reported
in Appendix B.
If the government of country 2 levies the optimal tari↵ ⌧ = ⌧⇤, we can state what follows:
Proposition 4 [Tari↵] There exists no import tari↵ whereby the larger country’s welfare exceeds its
autarkic level.
Proof. In order to prove the proposition it is su cient to observe that:
SWT⌧2   SWA2 =
1
12
⇥
↵+ 7↵2 + 3↵3 + 8↵  + (    2)    2⇤ ; (3.8)
is strictly negative over the admissible range of parameters ↵ and  .
Hence, for what concerns country 2, an optimal tari↵ is never e↵ective in determining an increase in
social welfare of the same country as compared to the autarkic equilibrium. The reason basically lies in
the fact that the tari↵ itself does not su ce to raise free trade profits over the autarkic equilibrium level.
An optimal tari↵, in fact, never restores autarky, and then, always implies a negative quantity e↵ect for
firm 2 sales, associated with trade liberalisation.13
What stated so far, obviously holds even in the case a suboptimal tari↵ ⌧ = ⌧¯ is levied, for ↵ 2]0, 12 [ and
  2]max[1  4↵, 0], 1[. As for country 1, see Appendix B for a detailed assessment of the e↵ects of trade
liberalisation in the presence of an optimal tari↵ ⌧⇤.
3.2 Subsidisation and trade reversal
In the last subsection we have identified the parametric range in which an optimal tari↵ can be levied by
the government of country 2. We have also stated that, outside this range, if the government wants to
impose an import tari↵, it must choose a sub-optimal level of the latter, that is the one restoring autarky,
⌧ = ⌧¯ . As an alternative to this, the government may undertake an export subsidy policy. The latter
is obviously defined only for mˆ   ↵ < 0, that is, the marginal consumer has to be located in country 1.
This also implies that the demand system has to be newly defined, in order to account for the trade flow
reversal. Marginal consumer is thus now identified by solving the following condition:
pT✓1 + (mˆT✓   xT✓1 )2 +  mˆT✓ = pT✓2 + (mˆT✓   xT✓2 )2 +  mˆT✓, (3.9)
12Note that, ↵ 2] 14 , 12 [ is su cient but not necessary condition for ⌧⇤ > ⌧¯ .
13Notwithstanding this, with a tari↵, a smaller part of consumers living in country 2 switches to firm 1, and price
competition is undoubtedly relaxed. This implies that trade liberalisation necessarily reduces profits of firm 2 by a lesser
amount as compared to the case in which no tari↵ is levied. On the consumers’ side, the decrease in surplus due to higher
prices is partially compensated by the gross tari↵ revenues. Since the positive e↵ect exerted by the tari↵ on profits is not
fully compensated by the corresponding negative e↵ect on consumer surplus, we can state that, with regards to the larger
country, the tari↵ acts in limiting the negative e↵ect of trade liberalisation on the social welfare.
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where apex T✓ stands for trade with subsidy. The latter condition, by Lemma 1, yields the same results
as in (2.10-2.11).
If we now suppose that country 2’s government provides to firm 2 a subsidy ✓ > 0 for each of the ↵ mˆT✓
units of green good export to country 1, profits of firm 2 become:
⇡T✓2 = p
T✓
2 mˆT✓ + ✓(↵  mˆT✓); (3.10)
while countries’ social welfares:
SWT✓1 = ⇡
T✓
1 + CS
T✓
1    mˆT✓; SWT✓2 = ⇡T✓2 + CST✓2   ✓(↵  mˆT✓); (3.11)
From (3.11), equilibrium social welfare of country 2 is supposed to be reduced by an amount equal to the
subsidy provided to firm 2; this amount can be higher or lower than the negative externality su↵ered by
the community in case of importing the brown good. As for country 1, the externality in consumption
hurts social welfare by a lesser amount w.r.t. the framework analyzed in section 2 (see (2.9)), since now a
part of consumers switches to the green good produced by firm 2. Again, the equilibrium arising is such
that xT✓1 = 0 and x
T✓
2 = 1, implying the following marginal consumer’s equilibrium location:
mˆT✓ =
3  ✓
6
; (3.12)
where the latter is obviously decreasing in ✓, while equilibrium prices are: pT✓1 = 1   ✓3 ; pT✓2 = 1   2✓3 .
Note that both prices are decreasing in ✓, that is the subsidy strengthens the price competition stemming
from trade liberalisation; this obviously happens since subsidised firm 2 can now sustain a lower price.
Non negativity of both prices is verified for ✓ 2]0, 32 [. From the condition of non-negativity of country 1’s
imports (mˆT✓   ↵ < 0) we can derive minimum level of the subsidy ✓:
✓¯ = 3  6↵. (3.13)
The latter condition is necessary since, similarly to what underlined in the preceding subsection, for each
✓ < ✓¯ the model would predict a reversal of trade flows with mˆT✓ > ↵; which would, again, invalidate the
demand system and translate the subsidy into a tari↵ for firm 2, proportional to the externality generated
by the consumption of firm 1’s imported output. Full market coverage is now assured if consumers’ surplus
is greater than:
sT✓MC =
1
36
 
45  18  + 36↵    18✓ + 6 ✓ + ✓2  , (3.14)
where, again, sT✓MC > s
A
p 8 ↵ 2]0, 1/2[,   2]0, 1[, ✓ 2]0, 32 [.
Country 2’ governments objective function is then:
max
✓
SWT✓2 s.t. ✓   ✓¯, (3.15)
which yields:
✓⇤ =
3
4
(3  4↵) 8 ↵ 2] 1
4
,
1
2
[,   2]0, 1].
For ✓ = ✓⇤ the marginal consumer locates at:
mˆ⇤T✓ =
4(1 + ↵)  3
8
.
Note that, for higher ↵, the gain in demand for firm 2 (↵   mˆ⇤T✓) is necessarily higher; this amounts
to saying that ✓ can be fixed to a lower level in order to obtain an equivalent rise in profits (@✓
⇤
@↵ < 0).
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For ✓ > ✓⇤, in fact, firm 2’ s demand would rise, accompanied by an even higher price competition; the
consequent increase in consumer surplus of inhabitants of country 2 would then be not high enough to
repay the increase in subsidy expenditure plus the decrease in firm 2 profits. The subsidy, though directly
accruing to firm 2, is undoubtedly acting in favour of a redistribution from firm 2’s profits to consumer
surplus.
For ↵ 2]0, 1/4[ country 2’s government cannot implement ✓⇤ since ✓⇤ < ✓¯, nor a non-optimal tari↵ ✓ = ✓¯,
since the latter would imply a negative price for the brown good.
Under the hypothesis that Government of country 2 levies a ✓⇤ tari↵, we can thus state what follows:
Proposition 5 [Welfare with Subsidy]The long-run e↵ect of trade liberalisation on social welfare consists
in: (i) an increase in the welfare of the smaller country for a su ciently high emission intensity and a
su ciently small asymmetry in size between the two countries; (ii) an increase in the welfare of the larger
country if the asymmetry in size is su ciently small and (iii) an increase in the welfare at the world level
for a wider parameters’ range w.r.t. the one assuring that both (i) and (ii) hold.
Proof. In order to prove part (i) of Proposition 1 is su cient to observe that, for ✓ = ✓⇤, ↵ 2] 14 , 12 [ and
  2]0, 1[:
SWT✓1   SWA1 =
1
64
[3  8↵(1 + 2↵(1 + ↵)  4 )  8 ] > 0
iff   2] 3  8↵[1 + 2↵(1 + ↵)]
8  32↵ , 1[; (3.16)
while, for what concerns part (ii):
SWT✓2   SWA2 =
1
12
⇥
↵+ 7↵2 + 3↵3 + 8↵  + (    2)    2⇤ > 0
iff ↵ 2]0.452, 0.5[. (3.17)
For what concerns the last claim in the proposition:
SWT✓   SWA = 1
64
[8↵(1 + 4 )  9  8 ] > 0
iff ↵ 2]0.425, 0.5[,   2] 8↵  9
8  32↵ , 1[. (3.18)
The way trade liberalisation a↵ects profits and consumer surpluses is summarised in the following:
Proposition 6 [Profits and Consumer Surpluses with Subsidy] Free trade, through price e↵ect, brings
about (i) an increase in consumer surpluses of both countries; (ii) a decrease in profits accruing to both
firms.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Hence, di↵erently from the import tari↵ policy (see Proposition 4), the subsidy policy may entail a
rise in the social welfare of country 2 without necessarily hurting country 1; this requires country 1 to be
su ciently large and the emission intensity to be su ciently high.
12
A higher ↵, through a lower equilibrium subsidy ✓⇤ implies a lower transfer from consumers/inhabitants
of country 2 to firm 2; moreover, it limits the negative e↵ect on firm 2 profits and the positive e↵ect on
consumer surplus associated with any positive subsidy, since price competition is relaxed. The former two
e↵ects are shown to be always stronger than the latter14 implying that the marginal e↵ect of ↵ on free
trade social welfare of country 2 is strictly positive. Moreover, this is shown to be always greater than
the marginal e↵ect on the social welfare in autarky, since @SW
A
2
@↵ < 0; in that case, in fact, a reduction in
the asymmetry between countries entails a decrease in the profits and in the consumer surplus of country
2, where the former e↵ect is driven by the decrease in demand and the latter by the increase in the price
of the green good.
For what concerns country 1, the e↵ect of ↵ is not a priori defined and depends on the level of  .15
Consequently, for a higher  , we observe an increase in the burden of externality borne by inhabitants of
country 1 which is clearly higher in autarky than in free trade. In the latter case, in fact, some of them
switch to the clean good. Thus, given
@SWA1
@ 
<
@SWT✓1
@ 
< 0,
a higher emission intensity, though strictly depressing the social welfare, is always associated with an
increase in the di↵erential between its post and pre trade liberalisation equilibrium values.
Proven that   is high enough to account for this positive e↵ect of trade liberalisation, even ↵ has to be high
enough. Size of the smaller country in fact: (i) raises free trade equilibrium profits through an increase
in price and demand (@mˆ
⇤
T✓
@↵ > 0), (ii) raises consumer surplus (proven that s >
1
8
 
3 + 12↵+ 8↵2
 
) and
(iii) it determines an increase in the burden of externality borne by the inhabitants of country 1.
Consequently, for high   and low ↵ the gains from trade liberalisation accruing to country 1 only consist
in lower emissions and in a higher consumer surplus, which are not enough to compensate for the loss
in profits; for a high ↵ and a low   the opposite is true: both the loss in profits and the emissions
are strongly reduced by trade liberalisation, but this is accompanied by a higher reduction in consumer
surplus. The latter considerations entails claim (i) in Proposition 5.
3.3 Discussion
Along this section we have analyzed the e↵ects of trade liberalisation under the hypothesis of country 2
alternatively undertaking two policies in order to contain trade liberalisation’s negative e↵ect, the latter
being even reinforced by the externality stemming from consumption of the imported brown good (see
section 2). We may now take a closer look at the feasibility of trade liberalisation itself, considered as
the outcome of a game where both countries’ payo↵s are represented by social welfare gains w.r.t. the
autarkic equilibrium. Figure 1 provides an exhaustive summary of the parameters’ ranges characterizing
di↵erent results in terms of social welfare dynamics from autarky to free trade, for both countries. We
may firstly distinguish three ranges, delimiting the feasibility of both policies. According to results so far
provided, for ↵ 2]0, 0.25[ and   2]0, 1 4↵[, the feasible policy is an optimal tari↵ ⌧ = ⌧⇤; for ↵ 2]0, 0.25[
and   2]1 4↵, 1[, only a sub-optimal tari↵ policy is allowed and, lastly, for ↵ 2]0.25, 0.5[, the government
may only choose between an optimal subsidy ✓ = ✓⇤ or a suboptimal tari↵ ⌧ = ⌧¯ . Moreover, in the second
14
     @⇡LS2@↵      >      @CSLS2@↵     .
15From Appendix (A.1), (B.3), in fact, ↵ enters in the autarkic and free trade equilibrium definition of SW1 multiplied
by a factor  .
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range, since  SWA,T✓2 >  SW
A,T ⌧¯
2 , the government will necessarily choose a subsidy policy.
16
Figure 1: Welfare e↵ects of trade liberalisation with tari↵ and subsidy, parameters’ ranges
In addition to this, from Proposition 4 and 6, the parameters’ range corresponding to area A:
↵ 2]0.452, 0.5[;   2] 3  8↵[1 + 2↵(1 + ↵)]
8  32↵ , 1[;
is the only one which is compatible with a Nash bargaining solution, since it is associated with strictly
positive  SWA,T✓1 and  SW
A,T✓
2 . Both countries have therefore incentive to open to trade, and trade
liberalisation yields:
 SWA,T✓1 =  SW
A,T✓
2 =
 SWA,T✓
2
.
The required side payment is in favour of country 2 for
↵ 2]0.452, 0.478[;   2] 15  8↵[3 + 4↵(1 + ↵)]
8  32↵ , 1[;
since in correspondence of this range we have that  SWA,T✓1 >  SW
A,T✓
2 . The opposite is true for the
range which is complementary to A.
Anyway, this is not the unique range in which trade liberalisation may be mutually beneficial. From
Proposition 5 total world welfare is shown to be strictly increasing in the following parameter ranges:
↵ 2]0.425, 0.452[;   2] 8↵  9
8  32↵ , 1[; ↵ 2]0.452, 0.5[;   2]
8↵  9
8  32↵ ,
3  8↵[1 + 2↵(1 + ↵)]
8  32↵ [;
respectively labeled as areas B and C in Figure 1 . In correspondence of these ranges the sign of the
welfare di↵erential is negative for at least one of the two countries: while area B is characterized by a
16 KA,ji with i = 1, 2, j = T, T ⌧, T✓, and K = SW,CS, TC, p,⇡, indicates the value of the di↵erential from the autarkic
equilibrium to the j-equilibrium for what concerns the magnitude K in country i.
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gain for country 1 and a loss for country 2, the opposite is true for area C. In a supergame played over an
infinite horizon, this problem could be e↵ectively solved to generate a Pareto-e cient outcome. Applying
Friedman (1971), i.e., the perfect folk theorem, the relevant condition is:
1
1    ( SW
A,T✓
i   Tri)    SWA,T✓i +
 
1   SW
A
i , (3.19)
where Tri is the required side payment and i = 1, 2 respectively in B and C. It is straightforward to show
that (3.19) requires
     ˆi = Tri
SWT✓i   2SWAi
. (3.20)
Condition (3.20) reveals that SWT✓i < 2SW
A
i su ces to ensure the sustainability of the Pareto-e cient
equilibrium outcome at the subgame perfect equilibrium of the supergame. The latter condition is shown
to hold for each ↵ and   in C and for each ↵,   and s > 9 24↵ 48↵
2 32↵3 24 +288↵ 
192↵ in B. If instead
sT✓MC < s <
9 24↵ 48↵2 32↵3 24 +288↵ 
192↵ , the threshold value of the discount rate  ˆ1 is positive and it
remains to be checked whether it lies below 1. This happens for all Tr1 < SWT✓1   2SWA1 , whose r.h.s.
is linear and decreasing in s. Therefore, region B also hosts an additional subset of parameters in which
the long run equilibrium generated by the supergame is Pareto-e cient:
s 2  sT✓MC , s  ; Tr1 2  0, SWT✓1   2SWA1  
where
s ⌘ 9  24↵  48↵
2   32↵3   24  + 288↵ 
192↵
.
This portion of the parameter space is illustrated in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Threshold discount rate and side-payment, country 1, region B
4 The larger country is brown
As we have fully characterized the case in which the smaller country hosts the firm producing the brown
good, we may now investigate the opposite case: the brown good is produced in the larger among the
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two countries. This implies no change in the autarkic equilibrium level of all magnitudes except for social
welfare:
SWA1 = ⇡
A
1 + CS
A
1 ; SW
A
2 = ⇡
A
2 + CS
A
2    (1  ↵).
At equilibrium, the above expressions write as follows:
SWA1 = ↵(s 
t↵2
12
   ); SWA2 =
1
12
(1  ↵)[12s  t(1  ↵)2]. (4.1)
Note that, while the social welfare of country 2 is negatively a↵ected by the consumption of the brown
good (yA122 = 1   ↵), this does not a↵ect the social welfare of country 1. Non negativity of both prices
still requires imposing (2.8).
At the free trade equilibrium, Lemma 1 still obviously holds, together with (2.9-2.11). Full market
coverage is now ensured if:
s   sTMC =
1
4
[5 + 2 ], (4.2)
where again
sTMC > s
A
p 8↵ 2]0, 1/2[,  2]0, 1[,
so that the condition for full market coverage in the long run also su ces to ensure the non-negativity
of prices in autarky. We still have that, in equilibrium, xT11 = 0, x
T1
2 = 1, p
T1
1 = p
T1
2 = 1, mˆ = 1/2 and
⇡T11 = ⇡
T1
2 = 1/2. Since the location of the marginal consumer is the same as in (2.10), the resulting
total transportation costs and consumer surpluses are those in A.2, while social welfare levels are:
SWT1 =
1
2
  ↵(1  s)  1
3
↵3; SWT2 = s(1  ↵) + ↵(1 +
1 + ↵
3
2
)  6  + 7
12
. (4.3)
4.1 Trade liberalisation e↵ects
In view of the above considerations about the location of the indi↵erent consumer at the free trade equilib-
rium, the present framework fully retains the statements contained in Proposition 2-3.17 Notwithstanding
this, from (4.1) and (4.3) we can state what follows:
Proposition 7 [Welfare] Trade liberalisation causes (i) an increase in the welfare of the smaller country
if the latter is su ciently small; (ii) a decrease in the welfare of the larger country, irrespective of
countries’ relative size; and (iii) an increase in the welfare at the world level for su ciently high intensity
of the emissions stemming from the consumption of the brown good and su ciently small asymmetry in
size between the two countries.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition (7) thus implies that, when the polluting good is produced in the larger country, trade
liberalisation may be, per se, welfare improving at the world level. Recalling (3.19) this applies provided
that SWT1 < 2SW
A
1 which is trivially shown to hold for each ↵,   and s >
3 6↵ ↵3
6↵ .
The elementary intuition for this result is that, if the brown firm is based in the larger country and the
position of the indi↵erent consumer under trade liberalisation is independent of the location of the brown
17Note that in the case of profits, (2.13) still holds, but sT1 > s
T
MC , which assures non-negativity of prices and full market
coverage, is now met for ↵ 2]0, 1+p2 w 0.414[ and   2]0,min[ 2 5↵+↵32↵ , 1[. This now implies that (2.13) holds, regardless
of the level of  , for ↵ 2]0, 0.289[.
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production, then free trade here implies that the green firm necessarily penetrates the larger country
and therefore some consumers in the latter have access to the green good. This reshu✏ing of aggregate
demand at the world level in favour of the green variety reduces global pollution and opens the way to a
welfare increase at the world level.
5 Concluding remarks
We have investigated how the environmental negative externality stemming from consumption a↵ects
trade in an international Hotelling duopoly where two firms, that di↵er in the greenness of their produc-
tion, are located in asymmetric countries. We have shown that this kind of externality does not a↵ect
equilibrium demand partition: the firm located in the smaller country, whether producing a “brown”
good or not, exports to the larger.
Our results can be contrasted with the original formulation of the model, where no environmental
issues enter the picture (Lambertini (1997a)). In our primary framework (in which it is assumed that
the brown good is produced in the smaller country), consumers’ environmental awareness only implies a
reduction in the social welfare of the smaller country under autarky, and a decrease in the social welfare
of the larger country in case of trade liberalisation. On the contrary, in the same framework, the adoption
of a trade policy by the government of the larger country has been shown to be e↵ective in determining
a change in the distribution of gains and losses stemming from bilateral opening to trade. In particular,
there are admissible parameter ranges in which a Pigouvian tax on imports implies losses for the smaller
country even when the latter is very small, while improving the performance of the larger one. More
interestingly, an export subsidy for the firm producing the green good delivers a net gain from trade
liberalisation accruing to both countries, provided that the asymmetry in size is su ciently small and
the emission intensity is su ciently high. Hence, the presence of a significant negative externality in
consumption may be crucial in convincing larger country’s government to subsidise the firm producing
a green good; the reason for this does not consist, as expected, in classic export subsidy arguments of
import substitution, but rather in the fact that consuming a certain amount of the green good may turn
out to be beneficial for the smaller country too, since benefits directly accruing to the society through
reduction in local emissions may outweigh the decrease in firm’s profits.
The alternative scenario, based on the assumption that the green firm be located in the larger country,
yields intuitive results. Since market shares after trade liberalisation are the same as in the former setting,
here we reach the straightforward conclusion that free trade indeed generates a welfare improvement at
the world level because a portion of the population of consumers previously compelled to buy the brown
variant turn to the green one.
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A Autarky and free trade
A.1 Equilibrium magnitudes
Autarkic equilibrium, relevant magnitudes others than social welfares:
pA1 = s 
1
4
↵2; pA2 = s 
1
4
(1  ↵)2; (A.1)
⇡A1 =
↵
4
(4s  ↵2); ⇡A2 =
1  ↵
4
[4s  (1  ↵)2];
TCA1 =
1
12
↵3; TCA2 =
1
12
(1  ↵)3;
CSA1 =
1
6
↵3; CSA2 =
1
6
(1  ↵)3.
Free trade equilibrium, relevant magnitudes others than prices and profits:
TCT1 =
↵3
3
; TCT2 =
1
12
 
1  4↵3  ; (A.2)
CST1 = ↵
✓
s  1  1
3
↵
◆
; CST2 = s(1  ↵) +
1
3
✓
3↵+ ↵3   13
4
◆
;
SWT1 =
1
2
  ↵
✓
1  s+   + 1
3
↵2
◆
;
SWT2 =
1
12
  3  4(1 +  )  2 ⇥6s( 1 + ↵)  2↵  3 + ↵2 + (1  6↵) ⇤ .
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. In order to prove part (i) of Proposition 1 is su cient to observe that:
SWT1   SWA1 =
1
4
⇥
2  ↵  4 + ↵2 ⇤ > 0
iff ↵ 2]0, 0.4735[, (A.3)
while, for what concerns part (ii) and (iii):
SWT2   SWA2 =
1
4
⇥
↵
 
3 + ↵+ ↵2 + 4 
   2(1 +  )⇤ ;
SWT   SWA = 1
4
[↵(↵+ 4    1)  2 ]; (A.4)
where SW j is the social welfare at the world level, in correspondence of the j-equilibrium (with j =
A, T, T ⌧, T✓). Both equations in (A.4) are strictly negative over the admissible range of parameters ↵
and  .
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Consumer surpluses di↵erentials w.r.t. autarky are defined as:
CST1   CSA1 = ↵(s  1) 
1
2
↵2; CST2   CSA2 =
1
4
⇥
6↵+ 2(1  ↵)  2s  ↵2   5⇤ . (A.5)
Both strictly positive over the admissible parameter range ↵ 2]0, 12 [,   2]0, 1[. Then, since
TCT1   TCA1 =
↵3
4
; TCT2   TCA2 =
1
4
↵
 
1  ↵  ↵2  ; (A.6)
21
are also positive over the admissible parameter range, trade liberalisation always determines an increase
in transportation costs. This implies that, for both countries, the positive e↵ect on consumers’ surplus
determined by the decrease in prices is strong enough to o↵set the negative one stemming from the
dynamic of transportation costs.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. In order to prove part (i) of Proposition 1 is su cient to observe that, again:
SWT11   SWA11 =
1
4
⇥
2  ↵  4 + ↵2 ⇤ > 0
iff ↵ 2]0, 0.4735[, (A.7)
while, for what concerns part (ii):
SWT12   SWA12 =
1
4
⇥
↵
 
3 + ↵+ ↵2   4    2(1   )⇤ ; (A.8)
where the latter is strictly negative over the admissible range of parameters ↵ and  . With regards to
part (iii) of the proposition, concerning welfare at the world level, we have that:
SWT1   SWA1 = 1
4
[2    ↵ (1  ↵+ 4 )] > 0
iff ↵ 2]0, 0.438[,   2]↵(1  ↵)
2  4↵ , 1[ (A.9)
B Trade policy
B.1 Equilibrium magnitudes
Free trade equilibrium, relevant magnitudes for ⌧ = ⌧⇤:
pT⌧1 =
1
3
(7  4↵+ 2 ); pT⌧2 =
1
3
(5  2↵+  ); (B.1)
⇡T⌧1 =
1
18
⇥ 32↵2 + (1   )2 + 2↵(20 + 7 )⇤ ; ⇡T⌧2 = 118(5  2↵+  )2;
TCT⌧1 =
↵3
3
; TCT⌧2 =
1
36
⇥
3  12↵3 + (2  2↵+  )2⇤ ;
CST⌧1 =
↵[3s+ (4  ↵)↵  2    7]
3
; CST⌧2 =
36s(1  ↵) + 4↵[28  ↵(11  3↵)]  14  + 20↵  +  2   71
36
;
SWT⌧1 =
1
18
⇥
2↵(1  9s+ 8 )  8↵2   6↵3 + (1   )2⇤ ;
SWT⌧2 =
1
12
⇥
12s(1  ↵) + 4↵  1 + ↵+ ↵2   2  + 8↵  +  2   3⇤ .
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Free trade equilibrium, relevant magnitudes for ⌧ = ⌧¯ :
pT ⌧¯1 = 3  4↵; pT ⌧¯2 = 2(1  ↵); (B.2)
⇡T ⌧¯1 = (3  4↵)↵; ⇡T ⌧¯2 = 2(1  ↵)2;
TCT ⌧¯1 =
↵3
3
; TCT ⌧¯2 =
1
3
(1  ↵)3;
CST ⌧¯1 =
1
3
↵[3s+ (12  ↵)↵  9]; CST ⌧¯2 =
1
3
(1  ↵)  3s+ 8↵  ↵2   7  ;
SWT ⌧¯1 = s↵ 
1
3
↵
 
↵2 + 3 
 
; SWT ⌧¯2 =
1
3
 
3s  (1  ↵)2  (1  ↵);
Free trade equilibrium, relevant magnitudes for ✓ = ✓⇤:
pT✓1 =
1
4
+ ↵; pT✓2 =  
1
2
+ 2↵; (B.3)
⇡T✓1 =
1
32
(1 + 4↵)2; ⇡T✓2 =
1
32
(1  4↵)(20↵  23);
TCT✓1 =
1
3
(1  ↵)3; TCT✓2 =
1
24
↵[15 + 2↵(4↵  9)]  7
64
;
CST✓1 =
1
64
  1
24
↵
 
9  24s+ 18↵+ 8↵2  ; CST✓2 = 16(1  ↵)[1 + 6s  2↵(4 + ↵)];
SWT✓1 =
1
64
(3  8 )  1
24
↵
 
3  24s+ 6↵+ 8↵2 + 12   ; SWT✓2 = s(1  ↵) + ↵2 + ↵33   1348 .
B.2 Optimal tari↵, other e↵ects
In the presence of an optimal tari↵, the long-run e↵ect of trade liberalisation on country 1 still consists in
an increase in her welfare for su ciently low intensity of the emissions stemming from the consumption
of the brown good. In fact, for ⌧ = ⌧⇤, ↵ 2]0, 14 [ and   2]0, 1  4↵[:
SWT⌧1   SWA1 =
1
36
⇥
2(1   )2   16↵2   9↵3   4↵(1   )⇤ ,
iff   2]0, 1  ↵  3
p
↵2(2 + ↵)p
2
[. (B.4)
From Proposition 4 and (B.4) social welfare at the world level is strictly decreasing in the presence of an
optimal tari↵. For what concerns prices, transportation costs and consumer surpluses, the introduction
of a tari↵ ⌧⇤ implies no di↵erences in the sign of the dynamics from autarky to free trade, so as we can
retain the claims of Proposition 2; for what concerns profits, on the other hand, free trade may bring
about an increase in the profit accruing to the firm based in the smaller country if the latter is su ciently
small and the emission intensity is su ciently small too, while it always hurts the firm based in the larger
country. For what concerns firm 1, in fact, for ⌧ = ⌧⇤, ↵ 2]0, 14 [ and   2]0, 1  4↵[:
⇡T⌧1   ⇡A1 =
9↵3 + 2(    1  2↵)2 + 36↵(2  2↵+  )
36
  s↵ > 0,
iff s < sT⌧1 =
2 + 80↵  64↵2 + 9↵3   4  + 28↵  + 2 2
36↵
, (B.5)
where sT⌧1 is strictly decreasing in ↵, with s
T⌧
1 2]1, 12964 +  (3+2 )9 [ as ↵ 2]0, 12 [. Moreover s < sT⌧1 is
necessary but not su cient condition for (B.5) to hold in equilibrium since also sT⌧1 > s
T⌧
MC , which assures
non-negativity of prices and full market coverage, has to be met. The latter holds for ↵ 2]0, 0.219[ and
23
  2]0, 2(1 7↵
2)
2+5↵   3
q
↵2+10↵3+19↵4
(2+5↵)2 [ .
For what concerns firm 2:
⇡T⌧2   ⇡A2 =
27  36s(1  ↵)  9↵[3  (3  ↵)↵] + 2(2  2↵+  )(8  2↵+  )
36
, (B.6)
strictly negative over the whole admissible parameter range.
Hence, these results are not substantially di↵erent from those claimed in Proposition 3, except for the
fact that profits accruing to firm 1 are shown to increase with free trade uniquely in correspondence of a
stricter range of ↵. For firm 1, in fact, the positive quantity e↵ect of trade liberalisation mˆ   ↵ is now
decreasing in ↵ by a factor 23 (which is 1 for ⌧ = 0), implying that the advantage of being located in the
smaller country is reduced by 13 . In conclusion, di↵erently from the claim contained in Proposition 1,
social welfare of country 1 is shown to be decreasing even when the latter is very small (for ↵ 2]0, 0.25[),
provided that   is high enough, that is   2]1  ↵  3
p
↵2(2+↵)p
2
, 1  4↵[.
The emission intensity  , in fact, now enters in the long run equilibrium definition of all relevant magni-
tudes, through optimal tari↵ ⌧⇤. This has implications with regards to the dynamics of the social welfare
in country 1 inasmuch as a higher   is associated with a rise in the equilibrium price of the brown variety
as well as with a decrease in demand accruing to firm 1. While the former e↵ect unambiguously leads to
a decrease in consumer surplus for country 1’s consumers, the combination of the two e↵ects may entail
an increase in profits for firm 1, provided that ↵ and   are su ciently high.18
Since the negative e↵ect on consumer surplus is always greater than the positive e↵ect on firm’s profits,
the free trade equilibrium social welfare of country 1 is strictly decreasing in  :
@SWT⌧1
@ 
=
1
9
( 1  8↵+  ) < 0 8 ↵ 2]0, 1
4
[,   2]0, 1  4↵[.
Moreover, since @SW
A
1
@  =  ↵ (see 2.7), it is always true that @SW
T⌧
1
@  <
@SWA1
@  < 0. Thus, as   rises, social
welfare of country 1 is also necessarily reduced as compared to autarky.
B.3 Sub-optimal tari↵
Trade liberalisation, in the presence of a sub-optimal tari↵, brings about a decrease in both countries’
social welfares. In fact, for ⌧ = ⌧¯ , ↵ 2]0, 12 [ and   2]1  4↵, 1[ we have that
SWT ⌧¯1   SWA1 =  
↵3
4
; SWT ⌧¯2   SWA2 =
1
4
(↵  1)3; (B.7)
are both strictly negative, which also implies  SWA,T ⌧¯ < 0. For what concerns consumer surpluses we
have that
CST ⌧¯1  CSA1 =  
1
6
↵
⇥
6(1  6s) + 4(3  6↵) + 3↵2⇤ ; CST ⌧¯2  CSA2 = 12(↵ 1)  5  2s  6↵+ ↵2  . (B.8)
Both di↵erentials are strictly positive proven that s > 3   4↵ + ↵2. For what concerns profits we have
that
⇡T ⌧¯1   ⇡A1 =  s↵+
1
36
⇥
36(3  6↵)↵+ 72↵2 + 9↵3⇤ ; (B.9)
⇡T ⌧¯2   ⇡A2 =
27 + 2(3  6↵)(9  6↵) + 36s( 1 + ↵)  9↵[3 + ( 3 + ↵)↵]
36
;
where both di↵erentials are strictly negative.
18 @⇡
T⌧
1
@  < 0 8 ↵ 2]0, 17 [,   2]0, 1  7↵[.
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B.4 Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. For what concerns part (i), consider that strictly positive consumer surplus dynamics:
CST✓1   CSA1 =
1
4
(1  ↵)[4s  2↵(2 + ↵)  3]; CST✓2   CSA2 =
1
64
  1
8
↵
 
3  8s+ 6↵+ 4↵2  ; (B.10)
are necessarily driven by the decrease in both prices since
TCT✓1   TCA1 =
8↵[5  2(3  ↵)↵]  7
64
; TCT✓2   TCA2 =
1
4
(1  ↵)3; (B.11)
are strictly positive. For what concerns part (ii):
⇡T✓1   ⇡A1 =
1 + 8↵
⇥
(1 + ↵)2   4s⇤
32
; ⇡T✓2   ⇡A2 =
8↵[11  ↵(7 + ↵)]  15  32s(1  ↵)
32
; (B.12)
both strictly negative over the whole admissible parameter range.
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